This paper provides a novel axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which imposes consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal tradeoffs. The experimental design proposed in this paper will be useful for experimental work since it renders the short-run discount factor elicitation independent of the utility function. This makes comparisons of impatience across a spectrum of different consumption goods possible within the same framework, thereby providing a valuable tool for empirically exploring this new dimension. * We thank
Introduction
Understanding how agents trade off costs and benefits that occur at different periods of time is a fundamental issue in economics. For many years, the leading paradigm used for the analysis of intertemporal choice has been the discounted utility model introduced by Samuelson (1937) and first axiomatized by Koopmans (1960) .
As is well known, there are two main properties of this utility representation: time separability and stationarity. Time separability requires that the marginal rate of substitution between any two periods be independent of the consumption levels in other periods. This rules out intertemporal complementarity, habit formation, and related phenomena. Stationarity requires that a ranking of two consumption streams remains the same if both streams are delayed by one period.
The present bias-now a well documented phenomenon-is a failure of stationarity in which the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in periods 0 and 1, is smaller than the marginal rate of substitution between periods 1 and 2. For example, the following preference pattern is indicative of present bias. 
where both symbols and ≺ refer to the preference over consumption streams expressed at the beginning of time before receiving any payoffs.
It is well known that the present bias may lead to violations of dynamic consistency when choices at later points in time are included in the model. This paper is concerned only with the "time zero" choices, therefore its results can be used in combination with any of the auxiliary assumptions (naivete, sophistication, partial sophistication, costly self-control, etc.) used to tie together choices made at different points in time.
The present bias is a very intuitive and widely observed phenomenon and many utility representations that allow for this feature have been studied in the literature.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) , is a simple and tractable model of present bias preferences that has found many applications in economics.
1 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting evaluates a consumption stream (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . .)
where u is the flow utility function, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the long-run discount factor, and β ∈ (0, 1] is the short-run discount factor that captures the strength of the present bias; β = 1 corresponds to the standard discounted utility model. The above equation
implies that quasi-hyperbolic discounting retains the property of time-separability but violates stationarity. It does so, however, in a minimal way: stationarity is satisfied from period t = 1 onward, a property called quasi-stationarity. Our axiomatization relies on these two properties, as well as a third property that is closely tied to the experimental measurement of the parameter β.
The customary method of measuring the strength of the present bias focuses directly on the tradeoff between consumption levels in periods 0 and 1, see, eg., Thaler (1981) . The value of β can be revealed by varying consumption in period 1 to obtain indifference to a fixed level of consumption in time 0. However, this inference relies on parametric assumptions about the utility function u and is subject to many experimental confounds, see, e.g., McClure et al. (2007) and Noor (2009 Noor ( , 2011 others. Hayashi (2003) employs a conceptually related method that uses probability mixtures to elicit the tradeoffs. However, his method relies on the expected utility assumption and couples together the agent's risk aversion and his intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The method that our axiomatization is building on uses only two fixed consumption levels, but instead varies the time horizon. 2 In the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model the subjective distance between periods 0 and 1 (measured by βδ) is larger than the subjective distance between periods 1 and 2 (measured by δ), which is the reason behind the preference pattern (1a)-(1b). We uncover the parameter β by increasing this latter objective gap enough to make it subjectively equal to the former. The size of the gap needed is directly related to the value of the parameter β; for example, if β = δ, then the gap between periods 0 and 1 (βδ) is equal to the gap between periods 1 and 3 (δ 2 ). In this case, the following preference pattern obtains: 
We show how finding the right spacing of payoffs in time makes it possible to uncover the value of β. Different different sizes of the temporal gap correspond different to values of β. Since we are working in discrete time, for certain values of β there may not exist a corresponding gap that would make the decision maker indifferent. However, by relying on time separability we develop a more general notion of compensation that makes this indifference possible and helps us uncover β.
The crucial aspect of our measurement method is that for any given β the size of the gap (or the compensation more generally) is independent of the utility function u.
Thus, the measurement of β is independent of the measurement of u. This makes it possible to study how impatience depends on the consumption good. By focusing directly on the intertemporal tradeoffs instead of relying on the utility function the same elicitation method can be used for any consumption good. Comparing the discount factors obtained in such elicitations will reveal the dependence of impatience on the good the consumption of which is being delayed. Measuring the dependence of impatience on the consumption good would enhance our understanding of the present bias and may be helpful in investigating the relationships between the β-δ model and other models, such as Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) , which capture temptation without focusing explicitly on discounting.
The separation of the two aspects of preferences (discounting from utility) that is obtained in this paper is also important on conceptual grounds. The model has two kinds of parameters: discount factors, β and δ, which measure impatience, and the utility function, u, which measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
These two properties of preferences are conceptually and behaviorally distinct and the proposed axiomatization and calibration respect this separation and lead to the identification of the discount factors by measuring the exact types of behavior that these factors are responsible for. The parameter β is responsible for inflating the subjective distance between periods 0 and 1, as compared to the distance between 1 and 2. The preference patterns like (2a)-(2b) reflect precisely this property. This makes for a clear-cut measurement in comparison to the alternative methods which mix-in other phenomena, such as consumption smoothing attitudes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the primitives and basic notation. Section 3 presents the axioms and the representation theorems.
Section 4 presents the proposed method of experimental measurement of the parameters inspired by our axiomatization. Section 5 discusses the related literature. Proofs and additional results are collected in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
Let C be the set of possible consumption levels, formally a connected and separable topological space. The set C could be monetary payoffs, but also any other divisible good, such as juice (McClure et al., 2007) , or level of noise (Casari and Dragone, 2010) .
Let T := {0, 1, 2, . . .} be the set of time periods. Consumption streams are members of C T . A consumption stream x is constant if x = (c, c, . . .) for some c ∈ C. For any c ∈ C we slightly abuse the notation by denoting the corresponding constant stream by c as well. For any a, b, c ∈ C and x ∈ C T the streams ax, abx, and abcx denote
For any T and x, y define x T y = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x T , y T +1 , y T +2 , . . .). A consumption stream x is ultimately constant if x = x T c for some T and c ∈ C. For any T let X T denote the set of ultimately constant streams of length T . Any X T is homeomorphic to
. Consider a preference defined on a subset F of C T that contains all ultimately constant streams. This preference represents the choices that the decision maker makes at the beginning of time before any payoffs are realized. We focus on preferences that have a quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation over the set of streams with finite discounted utility.
Definition. A preference on F has a quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation if and only if there exists a nonconstant and continuous function u : C → R and parameters β ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that is represented by the mapping
As mentioned before, the parameter β can be thought of as a measure of the present bias. The parameter β represents the size of the subjective distance between periods 0 and 1. As we will see, this parameter has a clear behavioral interpretation in our axiom system and it will become explicit in what sense β is capturing the subjective distance between periods 0 and 1.
Axiomatic Characterization
Our axiomatic characterization involves two steps. First, by modifying the classic axiomatizations of the discounted utility model, we obtain a representation of the form:
for some nonconstant and continuous u, v : X → R and 0 < δ < 1. Second, we impose our main axiom to conclude that v(c) = βu(c) for some β ∈ (0, 1].
Our axiomatization of the representation (3) builds on the classic work of Koopmans (1960 Koopmans ( , 1972 , recently extended by Bleichrodt et al. (2008) . The first axiom is standard.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order). is complete and transitive.
The second axiom, sensitivity, guarantees that preferences are sensitive to payoffs in periods t = 0 and t = 1 (sensitivity to payoffs in subsequent periods follows from the quasi-stationarity axiom, to be discussed later). Sensitivity is a very natural requirement, to be expected of any class of preferences in the environment we are studying.
Axiom 2 (Sensitivity). There exist e, c, c ∈ C and x ∈ F such that cx c x and ecx ec x.
The third axiom, initial separability, involves conditions that ensure the separability of preferences across time. (These conditions are imposed only on the few initial time periods, but extend beyond them as a consequence of the quasi-stationarity axiom.) Time separability is a necessary consequence of any additive representation of preferences and is not specific to quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Axiom 3 (Initial Separability). For all a, b, c, d, e, e ∈ C and all z, z ∈ F we have The standard geometric discounting preferences satisfy a requirement of stationarity, which says that the tradeoffs made at different points in time are resolved in the same way. Formally, stationarity means that cx cy if and only if x y for any consumption level c ∈ C and streams x, y ∈ F. However, as discussed in the introduction, the requirement of stationarity is not satisfied by quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences; in fact, it is the violation of stationarity, that is often taken to be synonymous with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Nevertheless, quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences possess strong stationarity-like properties, since the preferences starting from period 1 onwards are geometric discounting.
Axiom 4 (Quasistationarity). For all e, c ∈ C and all x, y ∈ F, ecx ecy if and only if ex ey.
The last three axioms, introduced by Bleichrodt et al. (2008) , are used instead of stronger infinite dimensional continuity requirements. They are of technical nature, as are all continuity-like requirements. However, constant-equivalence and tail-continuity have simple interpretations in terms of choice behavior.
Axiom 5 (Constant-equivalence). For all x ∈ F there exists c ∈ C such that x ∼ c.
Axiom 6 (Finite Continuity). For any T , the restriction of to X T satisfies continuity, i.e., for any x ∈ X T the sets {y ∈ X T : y x} and {y ∈ X T : y ≺ x} are open.
Axiom 7 (Tail-continuity). For any c ∈ C and any x ∈ F if x c, then there exists τ such that for all T ≥ τ , x T c c; if x ≺ c, then there exists τ such that for all T ≥ τ , (captured by the quasi-stationarity axiom). The restriction that specifies representation (3) to the quasi-hyperbolic class imposes a strong relationship between the utility functions u and v. Not only do they have to represent the same ordering over the consumption space C, but also they must preserve the same cardinal ranking, i.e. u
and v relate to each other through a positive affine transformation u = βv (the additive constant can be omitted without loss of generality). In order to capture this restriction behaviorally we express it in terms of the willingness to make tradeoffs between time periods.
We now present three different ways of restricting (3) to the quasi-hyperbolic model.
It is important to observe that an axiom that requires the preference relation to exhibit preference pattern (1) is necessary, but not sufficient to pin down the βδ model: present bias may arise as an immediate consequence of different preference intensityas captured by differences in u and v. Therefore, in the context of representation (3), present bias could be explained without relying on the βδ structure. The additional axioms that we propose, shed light on what it exactly means, in terms of consumption behavior, to have different short term discount factors and a common utility index.
Compensation Axiom
First, we present an axiom that ensures δ is larger than half. We impose this requirement in order to be able to construct a "future compensation scheme" that exactly offsets the lengthening of the first time period caused by β. If δ is less than half, then there will be values of β which we cannot compensate for exactly. As discussed in the Introduction, our main axiom relies on the idea of increasing the distance between future payoffs to compensate for the lengthening of the time horizon caused by β. For example, if β = δ, then the tradeoff between periods 0 and 1 is the same as the tradeoff between periods 1 and 3. Similarly, if β = δ t , then the tradeoff between periods 0 and 1 is the same as the tradeoff between periods 1 and t+2. Because we are working in discrete time, there exist values of β such that δ t+1 < β < δ t for some t, so that the exact compensation of this form is not possible. However, due to time separability, other forms of compensation will be exact. Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that as long as δ ≥ 0.5, any value of β can be represented by a sum of the powers of δ. 4 The set M captures these powers; formally, let M denote a subset of {2, 3, . . .} ⊆ T . We will refer to M as compensation. Our main axiom guarantees that the set M is independent of the consumption levels used to elicit the tradeoffs.
Axiom 9 (Compensation). There exists a compensation
The main result of our paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 3. A preference satisfies Axioms 1-9 if and only if has a quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation with δ ≥ 0.5. In this case, β = t∈M δ t−2 .
Alternate Approaches
The compensation axiom ensures that v is cardinally equivalent to u. From the formal logic viewpoint, however, the compensation axiom involves an existential quantifier.
This section complements our analysis by considering two alternate ways of ensuring the cardinal equivalence: a form of the tradeoff consistency axiom and a form of the independence axiom.
Both axioms need to be complemented with an axiom that guarantees that β < 1.
The following axiom yields just that. 
.).
This axiom says that if two distant consumption streams are indifferent, one "impatient" (involving a bigger prize at t = 1, followed by a smaller at t = 2) and one "patient" (involving a smaller prize at t = 1, followed by a bigger at t = 2), then pushing both of them forward will skew the preference toward the "impatient" choice.
For both approaches, fix a consumption level e ∈ C (for example in the context of monetary prizes, e could be zero dollars). For any pair of consumption levels a, b ∈ C let (a, b) denote the consumption stream (a, b, b, b, . . .).
Tradeoff Consistency Axiom
Axiom 11 (Tradeoff Consistency). For any a, b, c, d, e 1 , e 2 ∈ C, If (b, e 2 ) (a, e 1 ), (c, e 1 ) (d, e 2 ), and (e 3 , a) ∼ (e 4 , b), then (e 3 , c) (e 4 , d).
and
If (e 2 , b) (e 1 , a), (e 1 , c) (e 2 , d), and (a, e 3 ) ∼ (b, e 4 ), then (c, e 3 ) (d, e 4 ).
The intuition behind the first requirement of axiom is as follows (the second requirement is analogous and ensures that the time periods are being treated symmetrically).
The first premise is that the "utility difference" between b and a offsets the utility difference between e 1 and e 2 . The second premise is that the utility difference between e 1 and e 2 offsets the utility difference between d and c. These two taken together imply that the utility difference between b and a is bigger than the utility difference between d and c. Thus, if the utility difference between e 3 and e 4 exactly offsets the utility difference between b and a, it must be big enough to offset the utility difference between d and c. such that is represented by the mapping
Moreover, it satisfies Axiom 10 if and only if β ≤ 1, i.e., has the quasi-hyperbolic discounting representation.
Independence Axiom
By continuity (Axioms 6 and 7) for any a, b ∈ C there exists a consumption level c that satisfies (c, c) ∼ (a, b). Let c(a, b) denote the set of such consumption levels. Note that we are not imposing any monotonicity assumptions on preferences (the set C could be multidimensional) and for this reason the set c(a, b) may not be a singleton.
However, since all of its members are indifferent to each other, it is safe to assume in the expressions below that c(a, b) is an arbitrarily chosen element of that set. 
5
The next axiom, is a version of Savage's P3. It ensures that preferences in each time period are ordinally the same.
5 We thank Simon Grant for suggesting this type of axiom. A similar approach along the lines of Nakamura (1990) is considered in the Appendix. δ ∈ (0, 1) such that is represented by the mapping
Experimental Design
The axiom system presented in the previous section is suggestive of a new experimental design. The proposed experiment provides a direct test of stationarity; moreover, under the assumption that the preference belongs to the quasi-hyperbolic class, the experiment yields two sided bounds on the discount factors β and δ.
The size of the bounds can be controlled by the appropriate choice of the compensation M . In the design proposed here we use the simplest compensation composed of just two consecutive elements, but more accurate measurements are possible.
For any choice of M the experiment does not rely on any assumptions about the curvature of the utility function u. In fact, whether the prizes are monetary or not is immaterial; the only assumption that the researcher has to make is that there exist two prizes a and b, where b is more preferred than a (but it doesn't matter "by how much").
As a consequence, the experimental design can be used to study how the nature of the prize (e.g., money, consumption good, addictive good) affects impatience, a feature not shared by experiments based on varying monetary payoffs.
The questionnaire involves a series of questions, each with the same structure. Each question asks for a comparison of two consumption plans: one "impatient" (with an early good payoff followed by two worse payoffs), the other "patient" (with an early worse payoff, followed by two good payoffs). No payoffs are given in any other periods.
For example
Under the assumption that the subject chooses according to the β-δ model, an answer to this question yields a bound on δ, as the choice of the patient consumption plan
if and only if δ 6 + δ 7 ≥ 1 if and only if δ ≥ .89. Similarly, the comparison of
yields a bound on β. For example, if the first alternative was chosen, then
if and only if β ≤ 1 δ+δ 2 ; using the bound on δ obtained above we have β ≤ .59. Stringing together a series of comparisons in a similar fashion with varying initial and secondary delays yields two sided bounds on β and δ. Generally, each comparison is indexed by two parameters: the initial delay T and the secondary delay S.
For example, the first comparison had T = 1, S = 6 and the second had T = 0, S = 1.
Varying T for a fixed S provides a direct test of stationarity and of quasi-stationarity.
The comparison can can also be helpful in detecting the correct period length-the minimal period length for which quasi-stationarity holds. Varying S together with T yields bounds on the discount factors, as exemplified above. This experimental design can be also used for parameter measurement under functional form assumptions other than β − δ, as well as a test of behavioral properties that do not rely on any functional form assumptions; for example, varying T provides a direct test of stationarity.
Alternate Design
An alternate way of eliciting β that is suggested by Axiom 9. Suppose that δ is known and we are interested in testing the hypothesis that β lies in some particular interval.
For concreteness, suppose that δ = .9 and that we want to check whether β ∈ (.72, .81).
We use Axiom 9 to test this hypothesis. 
Violations of any of the two previous relations will suggest that β / ∈ (δ 3 , δ 2 ).
Related Literature
A large part of the theoretical literature on time preferences uses the the choice domain of dated rewards, where preferences are defined on C × T , i.e., only one payoff is made.
On this domain Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) axiomatized exponential discounting.
By assuming that T = R + , i.e., that time is continuous, Loewenstein and Prelec The above results share a common problem: the domain of dated rewards is not rich enough to enable the measurement of the levels of discount factors. Even in the exponential discounting model the value of δ can be chosen arbitrarily, as long as it belongs to the interval (0, 1), see, e.g., Theorem 2 of Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) ; see also the recent results of Noor (2011) . The richer domain of consumption streams that we employ in this paper allows us to elicit more complex tradeoffs between time periods and to pin down the value of all discount factors.
The continuous time approach can be problematic for yet another reason. It relies on extracting a sequence of time periods of equal subjective length, a so called standard sequence. 6 Since the time intervals in a standard sequence are of equal subjective 6 The standard sequence method was originally applied to eliciting subjective beliefs by Ramsey (1926) and later by Luce and Tukey (1964) . Interestingly, the similarity between beliefs and discounting was already anticipated by Ramsey: "the degree of belief is like a time interval; it has no precise length, their objective duration is unequal and has to be uncovered by eliciting indifferences. In contrast, our method uses time intervals of objectively equal length and does not rely on such elicitation.
Finally, an axiomatization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting using a different approach was obtained by Hayashi (2003) . He studied preferences over an extended domain that includes lotteries over consumption streams. He used the lottery mixtures to calibrate the value of β. His axiomatization and measurement rely heavily on the assumption of expected utility, which is rejected by the bulk of experimental evidence.
Moreover, in his model the same utility function u measures both risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; however these two features of preferences are conceptually unrelated (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989) and are shown to be different in empirical calibrations. Another limitation of his paper is that his axioms are not suggestive of a measurement method of the relation between the short-run and long-discount factor.
meaning unless we specify how it is to be measured."
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity of the axioms is straightforward. For sufficiency, we follow a sequence of steps.
Step 1. The initial separability axiom guarantees that the sets {0, 1}, {1, 2}, and {1, 2, . . . , } are independent. To show that for all t = 2, . . . the sets {t, t + 1} are independent fix x, y, z, z ∈ F and suppose that
Apply quasi-stationarity t − 1 times to obtain
By part (b) of initial separability, conclude that (z 0 , x t , x t+1 , z t+1 , . . .) (z 0 , y t , y t+1 , z t+1 , . . .).
By part (c) of initial separability, conclude that (z 0 , x t , x t+1 , z t+1 , . . .) (z 0 , y t , y t+1 , z t+1 , . . .).
Apply quasi-stationarity t − 1 times to obtain (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z t−1 , x t , x t+1 , z t+1 , . . .) (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z t−1 , y t , y t+1 , z t+1 , . . .).
The proof of the independence of {t, t + 1, . . .} for t = 2, . . . is analogous.
Step 2. Show that any period t is sensitive. To see that, observe that by sensitivity of the period t = 1 there exists x ∈ F and c, c ∈ C such that (x 0 , c, x t+1 , x t+2 , . . .) (x 0 , c , x t+1 , x t+2 , . . .).
By quasi-stationarity, applied t − 1 times conclude that (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t−1 , c, x t+1 , x t+2 , . . .) (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x t−1 , , c , x t+1 , x t+2 , . . .).
Step 3. Additive representation on X T . Fix T ≥ 1 and fix e ∈ C. Weak Order, Finite Continuity and Steps 1 and 2 imply that (By Theorem 1 of Gorman (1968) , together with Vind (1971) ) the restriction of to X T is represented by
for some nonconstant and continuous maps v t,T and R T from C to R. By the uniqueness of additive representations, the above functions can be chosen to satisfy v t,T (e) = R T (e) = 0 (4)
Step 4. Since any X T ⊆ X T +1 , there are two additive representations of on X T :
and
By the uniqueness of additive representations and the normalization (4), the above functions must satisfy v t,T +1 (c) = γ T +1 v t,T (c) for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and v T +1,T +1 (c) +
By the uniqueness of additive representations the representations can be normalized so that γ T +1 = 1. Let v t denote the common function v t,T . With this notation, we obtain
Step 5. By quasi-stationarity, for any T ≥ 1 the two additive representations of on
represent the same preference. By the uniqueness of additive representations, and the normalization (4), there exists δ T > 0 such that for all t = 1, 2, . .
for all c ∈ C and R T +1 (c) = δ T R T (c). Note, that δ T is independent of T , since the functions v and R are independent of T ; let δ denote this common value.
Step 6. Define u := v 0 , v := δ −1 v 1 and R := δ −2 R 1 . With this notation, equation (5) is
Observe, that δ = 1 implies that v is a constant function, which is a contradiction; hence, δ = 1. Thus, R(c) =
all c ∈ C. Thus, the preference on X T is represented by
To rule out δ > 1 note that since v is nonconstant, there exist a, b ∈ C such that
v(a), so eb a. However, by tail continuity there exists T such that (eb) T a a, which implies that
Thus, (δ + · · · + δfor all T there exists b ∈ C such that x T c ∼ b. This implies that x T c c. Thus,
Since the sequence T t=1 δ t v(c) converges, equation (6) follows.
An analogous argument implies that lim sup T T t=0 δ t v(x t ) ≤ U (c), which establishes the existence of the limit of the partial sums and the representation.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We have (e, b, a, . . .) (e, a, b, . . .)
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
The following lemma is key in the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. For any δ ∈ [0.5, 1] and any β ∈ (0, 1] there exists a sequence {α t } t of elements in {0, 1} such that β = ∞ t=0 α t δ t .
Proof. Let d 0 := 0 and α 0 := 0 and define the sequences {d t } and {α t } by
Since the sequence {d n } is increasing and bounded from above by β, it must converge;
It follows that α t = 1 for almost all t; since otherwise there would exist arbitrarily large t with α t = 0, and since δ t < β − d for some such t that would contradict the construction of the sequence {d t }. Let T := max{t : α t = 0}. We have
which contradicts the construction of the sequence {d t }.
Proof of Theorem 3
The necessity of Axioms 1-9 follows from Theorems 1 and 2 and Lemma 1. Suppose that Axioms 1-9 hold. By Theorems 1 and 2 the preference is represented by (3) By the uniqueness of the additive representations, there exists β > 0 and λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R such that v(e) = βu(e) + λ 1 and γv(e) = βδv(e) + λ 2 for all e ∈ C. By the above normalization, λ 1 = λ 2 = 0. Hence, v(e) = βu(e) for all e ∈ C and β = t∈M δ t−2 .
Proof of Theorem 4
The necessity of Axioms 1-7 and 10 is straightforward. For Axiom 11, if (b, e 2 ) (a, e 1 ), (c, e 1 ) (d, e 2 ) and (e 3 , a) ∼ (e 4 , b), it follows that:
u(c)
Suppose that the implication of Axiom 11 does not hold, so that (e 4 , d) (e 3 , c). Then
Since 0 < β, 0 < δ < 1, equations 9 − 10 imply
By analogy, the second condition of Axiom 11 is also neccesary. Therefore, Axiom 11 is satisfied by the representation in Theorem 4. Now, we prove sufficiency. From Theorem 1 it follows that admits the representation in (3). Define the binary relation * over the elements of C 2 as follows:
⇐⇒ there exists e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ∈ C such that (b, e 2 ) (a, e 1 ) and (c, e 1 ) (d, e 2 ) and (e 3 , a) ∼ (e 4 , b)
We break the proof of sufficiency into four steps:
Step 1: First, we argue that * admits the following additive representation:
Using the definition of * and the representation (3) of , it follows that (b, c)
implies the existence of elements e 1 , e 2 ∈ C such that:
We consider the following 6 cases and we show that Condition 11 is satisfied.
: Set e = e 1 = e 2 for any e ∈ C, and choose e 3 , e 4 to satisfy u(e 3 ) + (11) is satisfied.
: Set e = e 1 = e 2 for any e ∈ C and choose 
Find e 1 , e 2 to satisfy:
And set e = e 3 , e 4 to get indifference.
Do the same as above.
In any event
). Therefore, the preference relation * admits an additive representation in terms of u.
Step 2: The preference relation * also admits a representation in terms of the index v:
Using the definition of * and Axiom 11 it follows that:
. Now, for the other direction, we proceed as
Proceeding exactly as before, there are elements e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 such that (e 2 , b) (e 1 , a), (e 1 , c) (e 2 , d) and (a, e 3 ) ∼ (b, e 4 ).
By Axiom 11, it follows that (c, e 3 ) (b, e 4 ). And therefore,
Step 3: Since the preference relation * admits two different additive representations it follows that the two utility indexes are related through a monotone affine transformation. This is, there exists β > 0 and γ such that for all a ∈ C:
We conclude that is represented by the mapping
with β > 0.
Step 4: Take a, c ∈ C such that u(a) > u(c). The existence of such an element follows from the sensitivity axiom. Choose b, d to satisfy:
Axiom 10 implies that
The two inequalities imply β ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 5
Remark 1. Both Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Nakamura (1990) study Choquet preferences, so their axioms have comonotonicity requirements. To have simpler statements and to avoid introducing the concept of comonotonicity in the main text we use stronger axioms that hold for all, not necessarily comonotone acts, but the comonotone versions of those axioms could be used (are equivalent in the presence of other axioms).
The necessity of the axioms is straightforward. For sufficiency, we rely on the work of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) . Note that their axiom B1 follows from our axioms 1 and 2. Their axioms B2 and B3 follow from our axiom 13. Their axiom S1 follows 
Therefore, using equations 13a-b
and using 14a-b Step 4 in the proof of Theorem 5 concludes the proof.
